Battle of Raphia: How Did It Reshape Ancient Syria?

On July 22, 217 BCE, two titans of the Hellenistic world clashed in one of the ancient world’s largest battles to decide the fate of Coele-Syria (modern Syria and Lebanon). The Battle of Raphia saw the Seleucid king Antiochus III and the Ptolemaic ruler Ptolemy IV lead their mighty armies into a confrontation that would reshape the region’s power dynamics. This epic conflict, part of the larger Syrian Wars, showcased the intense rivalry and military prowess of these historic empires in a decisive and dramatic showdown.

In 301 BCE at the Battle of Ipsus, the Diadochi (successors of Alexander the Great) clashed in the climactic struggle for Alexander the Great’s empire. When the dust settled, the victors carved up what remained. Seleucus I, for his role in the battle, was awarded Syria, which included the area of Coele-Syria. Ptolemy I, king of Egypt and an ally of Seleucus, however, used the chaos that ensued before and after the battle to seize Coele-Syria for himself.

Seleucus “in the matter of Coele Syria, for friendship’s sake he would not for the present interfere, but would consider later how best to deal with friends who chose to encroach” (Diodorus Siculus 21.1.5).

Seleucus was assassinated in 281 BCE before he could decide how to deal with his former friend and ally. Nevertheless, Ptolemy’s actions would have dire and long-lasting consequences. His encroachment pitted the two dynasties of the respective kingdoms against one another in a series of bloody and costly conflicts known as the Syrian Wars. For several decades the Seleucid Empire and the Ptolemaic Kingdom of Egypt, two of the largest powers of the Hellenistic world, vied for control over Coele-Syria. From 271-241 BCE, three bloody and violent wars were waged across three generations for control of this land with no end in sight.

The Fourth Syrian War

In 219 BCE, the Fourth Syrian War broke out when 19-year-old Antiochus III, the 6th king of the Seleucid dynasty, launched a campaign into Coele-Syria in an attempt to retake what the Seleucids deemed rightfully theirs. Antiochus waged a successful two-year war against the Ptolemies, capturing several important cities such as Seleucia Pieria, Tyre, and Ptolemais, and defeating several Ptolemaic armies sent to stop him.

Antiochus also significantly reduced Ptolemaic naval supremacy, something the Ptolemies had always enjoyed, through the capture of the major port cities of Seleucia Pieria, Tyre, and Ptolemais-Ake (modern-day Acre). Ptolemais-Ake was particularly significant as Antiochus seized 40 warships that were stationed in the city’s port, boosting Seleucid sea power.

Antiochus also managed to penetrate deep into Palestine. However, Palestine was the gateway to the Sinai desert and the pathway to the heartland of Ptolemaic Egypt. Consequently, Palestine was well defended, dotted with fortified and garrisoned cities and towns. Seleucid progress through Palestine was thus frustratingly slow.

Winter was approaching when Antiochus found himself pinned down besieging the fortified city of Dor, just south of Ptolemais-Ake, when a Ptolemaic embassy arrived proposing a truce. Antiochus saw this as an opportunity to rest, replenish, and regroup his army and consolidate his gains. He returned to the newly conquered Seleucia Piera as his winter base and dismissed his troops to their winter quarters.

At the same time, the Ptolemies were also desperately playing for time. According to Polybius, “the two things which they (the Ptolemaic ambassadors) wanted were delay and time to make their preparations for war.” The Ptolemies had neglected its armed forces, which had fallen into decline in the years after the reign of Ptolemy III. They were found wanting when it came time to oppose the Seleucid army.

Ptolemy IV was a weak ruler who gave himself over to debauchery and left the administration of Egypt in the hands of others. Polybius relates how unprepared the Ptolemaic army and its king were for the war: “The character of Ptolemy was so feeble, and his neglect of all military preparations had been so great, that the idea of protecting his rights with the sword, which was his most obvious duty, never occurred to him.”

The Egyptians desperately needed to bring its army up to standard by improving its effectiveness and expanding its manpower if it was to face Antiochus in the field. To rebuild their military machine, they turned to the one thing Egypt had plenty of: gold. Money was sent throughout the Greek world, hiring professional mercenaries to bolster their numbers and generals to train their soldiers.

Egypt’s standing citizen army soon consisted of 25,000 military settlers armed in the “Macedonian manner,” which consisted of a large two-handed sarissa pike and a small peltē shield attached to their left forearm. This Macedonian phalanx served as the backbone of the Hellenistic armies from the time of Philip and Alexander.

In addition to these, the Ptolemies had 2,000 peltastai and 3,000 royal guards who were also armed in the Macedonian manner. The phalanx was further augmented by 8,000 Greek mercenaries and 3,000 Libyans, who were also rearmed and trained in the Macedonian fashion.

Moreover, in a desperate move, Ptolemy broke with Hellenistic tradition and conscripted 20,000 Egyptian natives and armed and trained them in the Macedonian manner. This was considered a serious taboo that no Ptolemaic king had dared embrace in almost a century. The only other time the Ptolemies used natives in its phalanx was during the reign of Ptolemy I at the Battle of Gaza in 312 BCE. Even then, it was in much smaller numbers at 8,000.

With 20,000 armed natives, the Ptolemies could now field an immense phalanx of more than 60,000. While it gave the Ptolemies a numerical advantage, the arming of the natives would have dire consequences for Ptolemaic Egypt in the years to come following the Battle of Raphia.

Throughout the winter, the two sides negotiated with third-party neutral states, such as Rhodes and Byzantium, acting as mediators. Inevitably negotiations broke down and in Spring 218 BCE, Antiochus assembled his army and once again marched south. The Ptolemies were preparing the largest army it had ever fielded, but it was not ready to face Antiochus just yet.

A large contingent of Ptolemaic mercenaries was sent to occupy the Porphyrion Pass (most likely modern-day Ras Nebi Younes), a little south of Berytos, to block Antiochus. The Seleucids, however, had a large contingent of light infantry, well versed in mountainous combat. The Ptolemaic fortified position in the pass was quickly overrun and the defenders suffered heavy casualties.

The victory at Porphyrion was followed by the capture of several important cities in Palestine such as Scythopolis, Pella, Gadara, and Abila, securing a supply line for Antiochus’ further military operations. With these new acquisitions, Antiochus also convinced the local Arab tribesmen that he was the new dominant force in the area and thousands of Arabs joined his cause against their former Ptolemaic masters.

To make matters worse for the Ptolemies, several high-level officers, seeing the writing on the wall, abandoned Ptolemy and joined the Seleucid cause. These successes were consolidated when Philadelphia (modern-day Amman), a city where the Ptolemies were building up another force to resist Antiochus’ actions, was stormed and captured.

While Antiochus made valuable gains, it took almost the entire campaign season to do so, and winter was once again approaching. The Seleucid king called a halt to his invasion and wintered at Seleucia Pieria. All the while Antiochus was busy conquering, the Ptolemies were training and drilling their new military machine.

The Ptolemaic preparations for the ensuing battle continued through the winter. The Ptolemaic phalanx was supplemented with an additional 6,000 Galatians and Thracians (4,000 of these were military settlers and the remaining 2,000 hired from abroad) and 4,000 Cretans. The Ptolemaic cavalry consisted of 2,000 Greek mercenary cavalry, 3,000 Libyan and Egyptian horsemen, and 700 elite household cavalrymen, amounting to 5,700 cavalry. In addition, 73 war elephants were trained to take the field in defense of Ptolemaic Egypt.

In Spring 217 BCE, the Ptolemies finally felt ready to face Antiochus in the field. The Egyptians moved out to Pelusion, the gateway to Egypt proper, with a force that Polybius described as “an army of seventy thousand foot, five thousand horse, and seventy-three elephants.” Upon hearing of the movements of the Ptolemaic army, Antiochus moved his forces to Gaza. After a few final preparations and gathering supplies for the desert campaign, the two behemoths of the Hellenistic world finally met in June, just a few kilometers from Raphia.

Polybius gives a detailed account of the Seleucid army of 61,000 foot soldiers and 6,000 horsemen. It consisted of 20,000 military settlers and 10,000 argyraspides (silver shield elite guardsmen), all armed in the time-honored Macedonian manner. In support of his phalanx, he had 5,000 Greek mercenaries (likely armed as thureophoroi medium infantry), 2,500 Cretans, 10,000 Arab tribesmen, 5,000 Cissians, Carmanians and Medes, 5000 Daae, Carmanians, and Cilicians, 3,000 Persians and Agriganians, 1,000 Cardacians and 500 Lydians. All of these were armed as light troops consisting of bowmen, slingers, javelinmen and light spearmen.

The cavalry contingents consisted of 2,000 guard cavalry (1,000 hetairoi and 1,000 agema), and 4,000 regular cavalry regiments. In keeping with the Hellenistic “gigantisms” (a term used to refer to the immense size of the huge armies deployed during the period), the Seleucids deployed 102 war elephants.

The two armies were encamped close to one another for the next few days, and regular skirmishes occurred around the watering holes. It was during this time that Antiochus must have learned just how huge the Ptolemaic phalanx was. Antiochus seems to have made a desperate last attempt at evening the odds by rearming his 5,000 Dahae, Carmanians, and Cilicians in the Macedonian manner.

While Polybius does not mention that Antiochus took this action, Polybius clearly states that the 5,000 were “light armed troops” when he first describes the army on its march from Gaza. When Polybius describes the deployment at the battle, he explicitly mentions them as “armed in the Macedonian fashion.” If this is indeed correct, the Seleucid phalanx numbered 35,000 (10,000 argyraspides, 20,000 military settlers, and the 5,000 rearmed Dahae, Carmanians, and Cilicians).

The Seleucid phalanx of 35,000 was vastly outnumbered by the Ptolemaic phalanx of 61,000. Antiochus extended his line on the left wing with the 5,000 rearmed men and with a newly acquired 10,000 Arabians. All these troops were, however, light infantry and would not be able to hold their own for long against the enemy’s heavy infantry.

On 17 June, the two kings finally decided the fate of Coele-Syria in battle. Ptolemy was the first to take the field with his army. Antiochus was quick to answer the call to battle. The Seleucid deployment followed the standard Hellenistic practice with the phalanx in the center, light troops on both flanks of the phalanx, and cavalry on each wing. On the outer wings were placed the elephants. As with most Hellenist armies, the right flank was reserved for the elite units and the king.

The Ptolemaic wing, however, mirrored that of the Seleucids, meaning its strongest wing was on its left, facing the Seleucid right, with the two kings on opposite sides of one another. Polybius tells us that both kings rode up and down the line, giving encouragement to their troops, the phalanx in particular, as both kings believed the battle would be decided by the phalanx:

“The armies having been drawn up in this fashion, both the kings rode along the line accompanied by their officers and friends, and addressed their soldiers. As they relied chiefly on the phalanx, it was to these troops that they made the most earnest appeal, Ptolemy being supported by Andromachus, Sosibius and his sister Arsinoë and Antiochus by Theodotus and Nicarchus, these being the commanders of the phalanx on either side” (Polybius, The Histories 5.83).

The battle was opened by the war elephants. The Ptolemaic elephants were African forest elephants, inferior in size and strength to the Indian elephants used by the Seleucids. The battle between these elephants must have been spectacular. Polybius paints a vivid picture of the clash between the behemoths:

“… and now the men in the towers on the back of these beasts made a gallant fight of it, striking with their pikes at close quarters and wounding each other, while the elephants themselves fought still better, putting forth their whole strength and meeting forehead to forehead. The way in which these animals fight is as follows. With their tusks firmly interlocked they shove with all their might, each trying to force the other to give ground, until the one who proves strongest pushes aside the other’s trunk, and then, when he has once made him turn and has him in the flank, he gores him with his tusks as a bull does with his horns” (Polybius, The Histories 5.83).

On the Seleucid right and Ptolemaic left, Antiochus’ elephants drove the Ptolemaic elephants back into the Ptolemaic lines, crashing into the royal guard and throwing the left flank of the Ptolemaic phalanx into chaos. Then Antiochus seized the opportunity and led a cavalry charge from his right wing, spearheaded by his elite guard cavalry. He smashed into Ptolemy’s horsemen where Ptolemy himself was stationed and drove them off the field.

At the same time, Antiochus’ Greek mercenaries charged the Ptolemaic peltasts, driving them back. The charge of the Seleucid elephants, followed up by the charge of Antiochus’ cavalry and mercenary infantry, pushed the Ptolemaic left wing into a retreat. Ptolemy, however, somehow managed to escape Antiochus’ charge and took up a position of safety behind his phalanx in the center.

On the Seleucid left and Ptolemaic right, the opposite happened. Echecrates, the Ptolemaic commander on the right, observed the dust from the opposite side of the line and realized that the fight was going against them. An experienced military man, he knew that he had to act fast if there was any chance to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. He ordered the Greek mercenary phalanx to charge the Arabs and Medes opposite them while he led a charge on the Seleucid left wing with the Ptolemaic mercenary cavalry, supported by the Thracian and Galatian medium infantry. Echecrates’ charge drove the Seleucid cavalry on the left from the field while the Greek mercenary phalanx shattered the Arab, Cissians, Carmanians and Medes light infantry, throwing them into full retreat. As with the Ptolemaic left, the Seleucid left wing completely collapsed.

The battle, as the two kings had suspected, came down to the phalanxes. The Seleucid phalanx was vastly outnumbered by the Ptolemaic phalanx. The 2,000 peltastai and 3,000 royal guards on the Ptolemaic left wing of the phalanx had been driven from the field by the Seleucid elephants and the Seleucid Greek mercenaries. However, the 20,000 Egyptian native phalanx, the phalanx of 25,000 military settlers, the 8,000 Greek mercenary phalanx, and the 3,000 Libyan phalanx were all very much intact. The Ptolemies thus had a phalanx 56,000 strong compared to the 35,000 strong Seleucid phalanx. The Ptolemaic officers ordered their soldiers to lower the sarissae pikes and charge the Seleucid line.

The Ptolemaic charge overwhelmed the Seleucid line and Polybius tells us that it was only the elite argyraspides on the Seleucid side that could resist for a while. But outnumbered and outflanked, they too broke and abandoned the field of battle.

Antiochus’ impetuous charge was reined in by one of his captains, which Polybius calls “one of his elder officers,” highlighting the man’s experience. He called his king’s attention to the dust cloud that was moving towards the Seleucid camp. Antiochus wheeled his cavalry around and raced back to the battlefield, only to arrive too late to save the day and to see the devastating defeat his forces suffered.

It was a resounding victory for the Ptolemies, with the Seleucids losing 10,000 infantry, 700 horsemen, and 3 elephants, plus a further 4,000 soldiers were captured. The Ptolemies lost 16 elephants, 1,500 infantry, and 700 cavalry.

Antiochus has received criticism from both ancient and modern historians for his actions at Raphia on that fateful day. But this assessment may be unfair. The battle was going to be decided by the opposing phalanxes. This is reflected in Polybius’ statement that both kings “relied chiefly on the phalanx.” Antiochus had not expected that Ptolemy would have such a large phalanx at Raphia and was thus taken completely by surprise.

This is suggested by the fact that Antiochus made a desperate last-minute attempt to increase his phalanx by arming 5,000 of his light infantry in the Macedonian manner. Even with these additional troops, the Seleucid phalanx was vastly outnumbered compared to the Ptolemaic phalanx. The Ptolemies spent a small fortune hiring copious numbers of mercenaries as well as arming and training 20,000 native Egyptians.

Antiochus understood that he was at a serious disadvantage, but also understood that he had to fight or abandon all his gains throughout Coele-Syria. He could, however, not compete against the Ptolemies based on numbers alone. Antiochus led his cavalry on the right wing in a headlong charge against the Ptolemaic left wing where King Ptolemy himself was positioned. It’s very unlikely that Antiochus believed that his small phalanx could have beaten the much larger enemy phalanx. It seems rather that Antiochus had placed his hopes of winning the battle by striking directly at the head of the enemy army, Ptolemy himself.

The strategy was for his phalanx to hold the enemy long enough for him to capture or kill Ptolemy. Had Antiochus had been successful, he would have not only won the battle but the entire war. This is why his cavalry on the right wing with which he led the charge was so much stronger than the cavalry stationed on the left wing.

It was a sound strategy and was successfully used by Alexander the Great at the Battle of Gaugamela in 331 BCE. He was also vastly outnumbered and won the battle by leading a charge straight at the Persian king, Darius, and driving him off the field. When Darius fled, his army broke and fled the field.

In the chaos of the battle and collapse of the Ptolemaic left wing, however, Ptolemy somehow managed to escape and took refuge with his phalanx. It is very possible that Antiochus pressed the charge, pursuing the fleeing cavalry, believing Ptolemy was among them and hoping to overtake. But in failing to capture Ptolemy, Antiochus’ strategy failed, and Ptolemy won not just the battle but the Fourth Syrian War.