Can Violence Be Justified? A Philosophical Approach

In a world fraught with strife, few questions have proved as resistant to age as whether violence can sometimes solve problems. Treating this issue philosophically means delving into the ethical weeds—examining what we mean by “justified” and unpacking the moral implications of different kinds of force. It involves considering classic arguments on both sides and weighing factors that our predecessors never had to think about. Ultimately, though, by exploring various ethical theories and philosophical outlooks, we can gain fresh insights into an age-old quandary: Is there ever a good reason to engage in violence?

Violence is a complicated problem. It includes many different things that hurt or damage others’ bodies or emotions or violate their rights.

Physical violence happens when someone uses force to hurt someone else physically. This can be seen in things like fights, where people hit each other – or even in war, where one country’s military injures or kills people in another country (for example).

Psychological violence doesn’t leave marks on the outside as physical violence does, but it can make people very upset inside themselves. Bullying is one example of this: constant criticism and use of threats to control or frighten someone would also count as psychological violence.

Furthermore, violence can take the form of structural aggression, which is deeply rooted in social systems and institutions. This type of aggression may arise from power imbalances that result in the marginalization or oppression of certain groups, leading to their needs being unmet or their rights being denied.

For example, consider a society where people with different ethnic backgrounds do not enjoy equal benefits or equitable treatment. This would be an instance of structural violence at work.

Self-directed violence also exists. These are harmful acts that individuals inflict upon themselves fall into this category—think here about behaviors like self-harm or suicide.

In essence, then, violence isn’t only about how we behave when we “lose control.” It is a multifaceted problem with profound moral, legal, and philosophical dimensions for any society concerned about justice.

Socrates: The Foundation of Just Actions

In Plato’s dialogues, namely the Republic, Socrates didn’t only discuss justice as a political concept. He also thought it was about being good. He said being just means performing the job you’re best suited for and not interfering with others when they do theirs.

When someone’s mind, emotions, and desires work well together in this way, their actions will be right for them—and they’ll live well, too. If Socrates were considering whether an act of violence is justified, he might ask whether it helps or harms this harmonious state of mind.

For example, a soldier who defends their city by using violence—is that violence justified if it helps maintain order there (both in society overall and within individuals’ minds)? Such an action would fit within its performer’s role in society—and contribute to the good functioning mentioned earlier.

However, Socrates believed that violence motivated by personal revenge or uncontrolled emotions was unjust because it came from a soul in turmoil, where reason was enslaved to appetite or anger.

A person who commits an act of violence out of jealousy or spite falls into this category. Socrates would say such actions corrupt the doer’s character and damage the soul’s health.

According to Socrates, then, we could call violence only if it helped maintain or restore both soul and state order and if it fell within our natural obligations, contributing ultimately to soul goodness.

In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle developed a moral system centered on the Golden Mean. According to Aristotle, the Golden Mean is the desirable middle ground between two extremes, one of excess and one of deficiency, which we can find through reason and relative to us.

In terms of violence, this would mean that either extreme recklessness (too much) or cowardice (too little) should be avoided, as they are both vices. Instead, we should aim for the virtuous middle path.

This means that when using force, for example, it’s not about employing violence whenever we want (excess). Still, it does not involve shying away from using necessary violence to protect society (deficiency). Rather, it means using force wisely and only when all else has failed: this is what makes someone courageous in their use of force.

According to Aristotle, violence can be justified if it serves the virtuous purpose of restoring equilibrium and order. For example, within the Greek idea of philia—or communal love—one could argue that it is an act of virtue to commit violence to protect your community and ensure justice prevails (such as a city-state repelling invaders who would destroy citizens’ way of life).

In essence, Aristotle’s position suggests that sometimes violence might be fair if it is a proportionate response that aims to improve their situation overall – one that satisfies both individual and collective virtues.

Thomas Aquinas: Natural Law and Morality

Thomas Aquinas formulated the Natural Law Theory, which suggests that human laws should be based on eternal and natural laws. Eternal law is God’s ruling over all creation, while natural law is how humans participate in the eternal law.

Aquinas argued that human beings’ built-in tendency to do good and avoid evil can guide both moral decision-making and the making of human laws.

Aquinas also used his theory to justify certain aspects of war by providing some criteria for what would count as a “Just War.” If violence is morally acceptable, then it must meet three conditions.

First, the sovereign power who declares the war has to have authority that comes from legitimate sources. Secondly, there has to be just cause (that those who are attacked deserve it – there is something wrong on their part). Thirdly, the side engaged in hostilities must either intend to promote good or avoid evil (it can’t simply be about doing as much damage as possible).

Consider the instance of a country fending off an unwarranted assault on its people by another nation. Aquinas would view this as a fair reason for war. The head of state would have both the right and the duty to preserve the common good in this case.

Additionally, for a conflict to count as a just war under Aquinas’ theory, its aim must be to redress a wrong already committed or restore peace – not simply to seize something one covets or prove how brutal one can be.

In sum, violence is morally acceptable to Aquinas only if it complies with natural law and closely meets all of his “Just War” criteria.

Immanuel Kant’s ethical theory is based on the idea of the Categorical Imperative, a universal moral law that applies to all rational beings and commands them to only act according to maxims (personal principles) that could be willed as universal laws.

It states that actions are morally right only if they can be applied universally and if they treat every person as an end in themselves – not just as a means to an end.

When we consider violence through this lens and ask whether one could say, “It’s okay to use violence” as a maxim for everyone, things get very strict. Because if everybody followed this principle, the result would be a world full of contradictions and chaos – exactly what Kant does not want.

Additionally, often, when we commit acts of violence against others, we’re treating those people merely as tools or instruments towards some goal, which goes directly against treating them like ends-in-themselves (as Kant says we should).

For instance, when justifying violence as a form of self-defense, Kantian ethics might claim that it is morally acceptable only if the principle behind it can be applied universally without contradiction and without treating others solely as a means to an end.

Kant would likely argue that violence fails this test because it contradicts the unconditional respect owed to rational beings under his moral philosophy. The very nature of violence undermines the autonomy and dignity that Kantian ethics seeks to uphold for every individual.

So, within a Kantian framework, one could say violence is morally permissible only in rare cases where it satisfies the Categorical Imperative – such as when using force is the sole way to prevent a greater violation of someone’s autonomy and rationality.

Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialist philosophy revolves around the idea of radical freedom and the consequent responsibility that comes with it. According to Sartre, humans are condemned to be free – meaning we are entirely responsible for our own actions, without any essence or predetermined nature to guide us.

Every action we take reflects a choice we have made. Therefore, we must accept full blame for those actions.

Within this framework, it could be argued that violence can be an expression of freedom – particularly when used to push back against oppression. If someone is attempting to deny individuals’ freedom (and their very humanity), then surely using violence towards them demonstrates that you are free (and exist).

For example, during World War II, Sartre might argue that members of the French Resistance who committed acts of violence against occupying forces were exercising their freedom in a legitimate response against an oppressive regime.

However, it is important to understand that Sartre does not endorse violence for the sake of violence. He argues that those who employ violence in the struggle for freedom must recognize both their own accountability for their actions and the moral implications of those actions.

Sartre does not believe that one should use violence simply because one can or as a means of avoiding difficult choices. Instead, he suggests that people consider whether resorting to violence will ultimately result in fewer limitations on individuals’ freedom than would exist otherwise.

Considerations like these lead Sartre to a perspective on this issue that may seem paradoxical. On the one hand, he acknowledges that such acts have sometimes been effective ways to throw off old oppressions or respond to new ones. On the other hand, he insists there are always weighty ethical concerns involved – ones we ought to think hard about.

The moral complexities surrounding violence create a rich tapestry of beliefs, much like a mosaic formed from many ethical viewpoints. It suggests that violence is not simply right or wrong. Rather, its context and purpose add shades of grey.

On one hand, violence can be seen as an assault on both social order and individual flourishing. But there may also be occasions when it can be justified – if it serves to protect, bring about justice, or restore harmony within a community. In such cases, the use of violence might have moral worth.

However, this does not mean all bets are off when violent means are employed in these ways. They must still be proportionate responses driven by good motives – and pursued only after all efforts to achieve aims through peaceful methods have failed.

Using violence in this sense remains fraught with difficulty: those who choose it as a course of action bear a heavy moral burden and must consider carefully the likely consequences for society at large.