4 Important Philosophers of German Idealism You Should Know

The term German idealism broadly refers to the philosophical movement founded by Kant and critically developed by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Following their work, German philosophy dominated European thought from the late 18th century, changing views on self, nature, history, religion, politics, and the human mind. It began with Kant’s critical examination of reason, the defining concept of the European ideals of Enlightenment. Kant’s system attempted to bridge rationalism and empiricism, the two dominant Enlightenment philosophies. Post-Kantian philosophers sought to establish a more solid system, believing Kant’s to be flawed.

It is tempting to interpret German idealism as a teleological progression from Kant to Hegel. However, an examination of each philosopher reveals no simple progress or decline. Instead, each of these philosophers pursued unique projects guided by different assumptions.

The movement originated in Kant’s reaction to the main assumptions of Cartesian dualism—the certain and given self-consciousness, the certainty of self-knowledge over knowledge of external objects, and the belief in using pure reason to arrive at knowledge. As a result, Kant proposed a thesis that was so revolutionary that scholars referred to it as “Kant’s Copernican Doctrine.”

Therefore, the “idealism” part of German idealism becomes clear, as Kant argued that our cognition shapes our knowledge of the outer world. However, the later German idealist philosophers who responded to Kant’s groundbreaking doctrine believed in holistic systems encompassing moral philosophy, political philosophy, and aesthetics. The foundations of the core controversy were found in epistemology and metaphysics. Since Kant, philosophers have been concerned with two separate but deeply related questions: how to account for the reality of the external world and the possibility of knowledge.

1. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Empiricism, and Rationalism

Despite different interpretations of how to understand German idealism, scholars agree that the theoretical writings of Immanuel Kant gave rise to the movement. Critique of the Pure Reason, Kant’s first major work, quickly became a key text in German intellectual circles after its publication in 1781. The book was Kant’s attempt to explore the nature and limits of human reason in terms of epistemology and metaphysics. Kant was concerned with the problems arising from the then-popular Enlightenment theories of empiricists and rationalists. The main question he sought to answer was, “What can I know?” Empiricists such as David Hume believed knowledge was fundamentally based on experience (a posteriori). On the other hand, rationalists such as Rene Descartes argued that knowledge could only be arrived at through reason (a priori), as expressed in his skepticism about the external world in his famous “I think, therefore I am” argument.

Kant concluded that while we rely on experience to gain knowledge, our minds actively shape the data we receive through experience. In other words, the human mind is not a passive receptor of sensory data but interprets the input through its innate categories (such as time and space). This means that we have some form of knowledge of the tree in front of us, processed through our mind, but we cannot possibly know what it is independently of our cognitive faculties. In other words, we can only conceive of the tree as it appears to us. In Kantian terminology, no one can possibly know what that tree really is as a thing-in-itself.

“What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us.” (Kant, A42/B59-60, Critique of Pure Reason)

Kant describes the world of appearances as we experience it as phenomena constituted by our knowledge mediated by the categories of our mind. He describes objects of knowledge beyond our reach as noumena, consisting of things in themselves that exist independently of the perception of the human mind. This argument is a core element of Kant’s system, known as transcendental idealism, as it transcends the common understanding of the human mind as a mere sensory receptor.

These two components of Kant’s theory represented a shift from two notions that had gained wide popularity during the Age of Enlightenment: (1) the empiricist idea that our minds passively mirror the objective outer reality and (2) the rationalist view that we can attain knowledge through reasoning without experience.

However, it should be noted that Kant did not debunk the two schools but tried to overcome the division between them. His theory holds that we still use the external world via experience, although not as passive mediums. Regarding the rationalist position, although Kant concluded that reason alone cannot attain knowledge of objects, he held that it is practical for determining moral principles that govern human action. That’s how he constructed his famous categorical imperative, which doesn’t rely on experience.

Post-Kantian Developments in German Idealism

In a sense, Kant’s idealism can also be seen as a reaction against subjectivism, an effort to demonstrate the external world’s existence and overcome the egocentric quandary. Kant rejected both Descartes’ rationalism and Berkeley’s subjective idealism as they didn’t consider the external world as a source of knowledge. Thus, the criticism of subjectivism, as an attempt to construct a sufficient mode of realism, was, in fact, the moving force behind the development of German idealism. One type of idealism replaced another when the earlier type proved too weak a basis for realism. The German idealists thought that the external reality that external reality must somehow exist independently of human consciousness.

Post-Kantian philosophers shared the conviction that Kant had established the richest philosophical system of the modern era. However, they also saw flaws in his system. They were also certain that Kant had failed to adequately develop his systematic approach because he had become trapped in a dualistic mode of thought (noumenal-phenomenal) that was essentially contradictory to his declared goal of unity. This conviction turned them against Kant. If understanding is noumenal and outside space and time, how can it enforce its order on phenomenal appearances and in space and time? They also shared the belief that to avoid Kant’s dualism, it was necessary to provide philosophy with a monistic foundation and to accept monism as the only possible alternative to dualism. This belief was what made them German idealists.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte described how his first reading of Kant’s works revolutionized his thinking. Fichte’s philosophical system, which he developed in The Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre) in 1794, was based on the notion of the “pure I.” Fichte considered Kant’s notion of the thing-in-itself to be a contradiction in terms. He argued that there cannot be a thing-in-itself independent of human consciousness since a thing is a thing only if it is something to us. Fichte argued that Kant’s concept of thing-in-itself was a product of our thought—nothing but a postulation of human consciousness.

Fichte believed that Kant’s separation of things-in-themselves (noumena) and things as they appear to us (phenomena) would lead to a skepticism similar to that of Descartes. In contrast, Fichte claimed that consciousness is grounded on nothing but itself. Rather, the subject—or the transcendental ego in Fichte’s terms—is the source of external things. In this sense, our representations and ideas are mere products of the knowing subject. This is why his philosophy is often described as subjective.

Fichte and Kant are considered transcendental idealists because both accept the subject as the source of the form of experience. However, his rejection of the thing-in-itself and the unknowable realm and his implementation of subjectivity as the basis of his system separate him from his predecessor.

3. Schelling on Nature and the Subject

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling remained in dialogue with Fichte during his early works. In Of the I as Principle of Philosophy, written in 1795, he argued in favor of Fichte’s subjective idealism, stating that “I” is the condition of being and thinking. Since “I” precedes thought (as one must exist to be able to think) and since thought determines being (as a thing is a thing only if it is an object of thought), Schelling concluded that the absolute “I” must be the principle of philosophy.

Schelling changed his position in System of Transcendental Idealism (1800). First, Schelling’s philosophy of nature (Naturphilosophie) is an important element of his system. He wanted to show how nature and spirit (geist) complement each other. In contrast to the common view of nature as a mere mechanism, Schelling saw nature as a dynamic and self-evolving aspect of reality. This marked a shift from Kant’s distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal realms and led Schelling to argue that being and thinking could be interpreted from two different aspects—nature or spirit.

Schelling’s main conclusion from this interpretation is that subjective representations are the same as external objects. This position, known as absolute idealism, contrasts with Fichte’s insistence on the precedence of the subjective ego. Schelling’s understanding of “absolute identity” maintained that the subjective and the objective—the ideal and the real—are identical. Thus, one aspect that separates absolute idealists from transcendental idealists is that they do not prioritize the subject over the object. In this respect, Schelling’s philosophy can be seen as a bridge between Fichte’s subjective idealism and Hegel’s systematic absolute idealism.

Considered one of the last great philosophical system-builders in history, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s philosophy encompassed metaphysics, epistemology, political philosophy, aesthetics, philosophy of history, and logic. His great contribution to German idealism’s epistemological and metaphysical foundations is found in The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). Hegel employs his dialectical method to examine the development of human consciousness step by step by overcoming its internal contradictions.

From pure sense knowledge to absolute knowledge, Hegel provides a philosophical and historical account of the development of individual consciousness through various stages, such as self-consciousness, reason, spirit, and absolute knowing. In a sense, Hegel also takes up Kant’s project from Critique of Pure Reason. The difference is that Hegel historically explores reason’s scope and limits instead of a priori. This is most clearly seen in his famous master-slave dialectic, where he narrates a story between two confronting human minds to explain how true self-consciousness emerged in history.

Two crucial points can be drawn from Hegel’s examination. The first is intersubjectivity, which is the importance of other subjects for the actualization of self-consciousness, as explained in the master-slave dialectic. Hegel employs the same dialectical reasoning in Elements of the Philosophy of Right to show how individuals need mutual recognition to realize freedom in modern society. He also explains the historical progression of nations from tyranny to freedom through the same model, demonstrating the interconnected nature of Hegel’s holistic system.

The second point is his use of a historical method. One of his aims was to show how the rational structure of reality and human rational faculties are essentially intertwined. He thus joined his predecessors in opposing Kant’s dualistic view of noumenal and phenomenal knowledge.

Immanuel Kant, the critical philosopher of his time, created a whole new philosophical movement when he produced a systematic critique of reason—the dominant concept of the Age of Enlightenment. From exploring the limits of reason to the possibilities of human knowledge, the philosophers of German Idealism produced a rich and complex body of work. As a result, 19th-century philosophy abandoned the self as an epistemological “subject,” facing nature as an “object” of knowledge for an active self, a creator of its own unique social, cultural, artistic, and historical world.

How can we understand the history of this movement? It can be misleading to read Hegel’s version of the history of this period, as he tends to interpret it as a simple progression toward his own theory. Instead, it’s best to treat each system as a unique project. Accounts that divide philosophers into transcendental idealists (Kant and Fichte) and absolute idealists (Schelling and Hegel) may help to clarify the situation. The work of important scholars, such as Frederick Beiser, Frederick Neuhouser, and Terry Pinkard, can help illuminate different perspectives.

Beyond the movement’s enormous impact on intellectual circles, its most concrete and wide impact on the world was probably that of the last great thinker, as Hegel “…has been praised and blamed for the development of existentialism, communism, fascism, death of God theology and historicist nihilism.” (Hegel’s Phenomenology Pinkard, p.2, 1996)