Value Theory: Is it Immoral to Disrespect the Environment?

Imagine being the last man on Earth. After your death, nothing would be left on the planet. In such conditions, would it be immoral to blow up and destroy the very last Redwood on Earth before your death? This thought experiment, by New Zealander philosopher Richard Sylvan, is known as the “Last Man on Earth” example. The goal of the question is to make one ponder the role of nature and the environment, independently of the circumstantial relations they bear and the use that humans or animals make of them.

The subfield of philosophy known as Value Theory questions what the nature of value is and what it is for something to be considered valuable. Within the field, philosophers have identified two distinct kinds of value, known as intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic value is the value that something bears in its own nature, aside from the relationships it establishes with external entities and independently of the circumstances in which it exists. Hence, something is intrinsically valuable when it is valuable per se, and its value does not depend on anything other than itself.

Contrastingly, extrinsic value is the value that something has in light of the relationship it establishes and the circumstances in which it exists. If an object is extrinsically valuable, its value would not hold if it existed in isolation, as the value it bears is strictly dependent on the environment in which it exists, the functions it carries out, and the role it plays in its ecosystem.

Referring back to the Last Man on Earth example, for nature, the environment, and a Redwood to be considered intrinsically valuable, it would mean asserting that they would preserve their value after the death of the very last sentient creature on Earth. If that were the case, the value they bear would be wholly independent of relationships established with other creatures and of functions covered in the terrestrial ecosystem. On the other hand, arguing that blowing up the very last Redwood on Earth within the thought experiment would have no real consequences would mean claiming that nature and the environment bear no value aside from the value that other sentient creatures attribute to them.

Having established that value theorists discern between intrinsic and extrinsic value, which of these two is to be assigned to the environment and nature? Answering the question of the Last Man on Earth example seems like an easy and practical way to find the answer to the more complicated question of the value of the environment as a whole. However, is it really possible to simplify the matter by reducing it to a mere thought experiment?

Most people who reflect on the question would refrain from blowing up the Redwood. But does this prove that nature has intrinsic value? Claiming this without any further investigations would be quite rushed. Hence, we must proceed to examine all options. For a Redwood—and by extension for nature and the environment—to be intrinsically valuable, it would entail that its value is free from any relations with other beings and existing aside from external circumstances.

In other words, if one were to imagine a Redwood in complete isolation from anything and anyone, somewhere where no one and nothing would know about its existence and could benefit from its presence, would it still be valuable?

It is arguable that if no one was there to benefit from the lumber of the Redwood, its shade under the warm sun, its trunk to hide into, its branches to nidify, or the oxygen it produces to breathe, and if no one could even admire its beauty, be stroke by its old age, or create memories around it if no one could even know about its existence, maybe the Redwood would lose its value. It follows that the value that we assign to nature, which would likely stop us from blowing up the Redwood, must not be intrinsic. Why, then, would we be concerned about destroying it?

Given that a Redwood would likely not bear intrinsic value but rather some other kind of value, we move on to investigate what kind of extrinsic value may lead one to refrain from destroying it. While a Redwood – like most of the nature we are surrounded by – has some instrumental value to the creatures of its ecosystem, in the particular case of the Last Man on Earth example, the reason for not destroying it must lie beyond its purposes for other living beings.

However, the investigation must proceed in light of the fact that the realm of extrinsic values must by no means be restricted to the sole instrumental value. In fact, there are value-bearers whose extrinsic value lies in what they represent for a group of people, others whose value resides in their aesthetic form, which is considered particularly pleasant even if instrumentally useless, and others again who bear some personal value, having established a contextual relationship with an individual and becoming meaningful in light of a set of shared experiences. The number of religious, spiritual, cultural, and national communities that assign value to certain places, objects, animals, nature, or texts is countless.

This kind of value must be extrinsic, as it is confined to the perception of a community rather than encoded in the nature of the value bearer. However, it is clearly distinct from the pure instrumental function that the value bearer in question could cover.

What emerges from this is, firstly, that the potential number of extrinsic values is infinite and, secondly, that the assignment of extrinsic value can be relative and subjective to individuals or communities. Hence, distinct social groups would assign different values to objects based on traditions, experiences, culture, religion, and many additional factors.

What would then be the value of the Redwood and, by extension, of nature and the environment? We have established that while many may attempt to argue that nature has intrinsic value, it appears that all the value it bears is connected to its interactions with other beings. A natural environment that no one and nothing can access or even know about does not seem particularly valuable. On the other hand, Redwoods, like all nature, acquire value as they enter into relations with other creatures and become part of an ecosystem.

Hence, rather than stopping at the dichotomy of intrinsic-extrinsic value, it might be more beneficial to the cause to assume the existence of several intermediate kinds of extrinsic values, all presupposing an interaction between the value-bearer and the environment surrounding it. This would allow one to go beyond mere instrumentality and assume that creatures may value objects aside from the use that they can make of them.

Along this line, we could argue that the reasons stopping one from destroying the last Redwood, if they were to be the last living being on Earth, could be the sublime beauty of the tree, by which they are astonished, or some memory that was built around the area were the Redwood lies, or some particular devotion that they might have towards it due to cultural reasons, or simple respect for an old exemplar of the tree. All of these reasons are highly intertwined with the relationship that one has with the Redwood and, therefore, cannot be a symptom of an intrinsic and universal value of the Redwood itself. Nevertheless, they would certainly cause one to refrain from destroying it, demonstrating that these sorts of values attributable to the Redwood are by no means inferior to intrinsic value.

Having established that nature and the environment do not necessarily bear intrinsic value may lead one to ponder whether any form of extrinsic value is enough to enforce respect for the environment. While this is a valid concern, the fact that the value of nature appears to be extrinsic does by no means entail that one is entitled to disrespect it.

Extrinsic value is not to be considered morally inferior to intrinsic value. Hence, if something is considered valuable—intrinsically or extrinsically—it is to be respected. Furthermore, the fact that extrinsic value is subjective and relative to individual sensibility ought not to lead one to respect solely what is valuable to them.

Instead, respecting what is valuable to others lies within an overall value attributed to a society or a community. For this reason, even if some individuals do not attribute any particular value to the environment, most communities, for various reasons, do value nature, the planet, and the ecosystem surrounding them and—to distinct degrees—demand its respect. Therefore, even individuals who do not value the environment are encouraged and expected to adhere to the norms of the community they live in and respect by behaving with adequate regard towards the environment.

In conclusion, the lack of intrinsic value in nature ought not to lead one towards its disrespect. It should rather enhance the interest in the quest and encourage the exploration of the value that nature bears for oneself and other communities.